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Abstract: 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify areas for improvement in the current stakeholder 
management literature.  The current stakeholder management theories were analyzed to 
determine their benefits and detriments.  To determine how these theories work in a 
corporation, General Motors was selected as a single-case study to determine the patterns 
of stakeholder management over time.  These patterns demonstrated the need for 
dynamic stakeholder management over time, with an emphasis on collaboration and the 
necessity of recognizing the greater stakeholder network surrounding the corporation.  
Proper stakeholder management in the early years of General Motors would have 
prevented its failure, while the organizational culture as a path-dependent variable made 
it difficult for General Motors to alter long-standing stakeholder relationships. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
$0.55:  Closing share price for Motors Liquidation Company (formerly GM)1
 
 
$31 billion: amount the pension fund is underfunded2
 
 
$69.8 billion: losses since 20043
 
 
$172 billion: Total Liabilities.  Puts GM between Mexico and India based on external 
debt. 
 
 
The world knew General Motors failed the day it declared bankruptcy.  GM had known 
for years. 
GM wasn’t always in such failing health. In the 1920’s Alfred Sloan 
revolutionized GM by hiring Haley Earl to run the first in-house design studio for a major 
automobile manufacturer.4  Alfred Sloan created a car culture, spurring demand and 
allowing GM to grow exponentially in size and revenues.  In the 1950’s, GM was twice 
the size of the second largest corporation at the time, Standard Oil of New Jersey.  At the 
time, GM used its design and marketing insight to produce the most popular sports car of 
all time, the Chevy Corvette.5  By 1969 GM was making a profit of “$239 per vehicle 
world-wide… compared to $75 per vehicle per Toyota, $59 per vehicle for VW, and $57 
per vehicle for Datsun-Nissan.”6
                                                          
1 http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=MTLQQ.PK 
  GM continued to thrive economically for decades.  
Accessed 2/28/2010 
2 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_50/b3963114.htm 
Accessed 2/28/2010 
3 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=agMEuJ_r_yxA&refer=worldwide 
Accessed 2/28/2010 
4 Volti, Rudi Cars and Culture: The Life Story of a Technology. Greenwood Press, 2004, pg 52 
5 http://www.edmunds.com/chevrolet/corvette/history.html 
Accessed 3/7/2010 
6 Flink, James J. The Car Culture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975 pg 52 
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General Motors topped the Fortune 500 rankings every year from 1955-2001 (except 
from ‘75-’77 and ‘80-’85 when Exxon was #1 due to the oil crises).7
General Motors began as a company that was strong, healthy, and determined to 
excel.  GM was founded in 1908 and existed “primarily as a holding company composed 
of highly decentralized individual manufacturers.”
  GM would remain 
in the top 10 in the Fortune 500 rankings every year from 2002 onwards.  GM’s 2009 
bankruptcy announcement seemed to blindside the company as much as its investors. 
8  The story of early General Motors is 
bound up in the managerial genius of Alfred Sloan.  Sloan took control of the company 
when William C. Durant was ousted by the board for his dangerous levels of stock 
market speculation in 1921.  Sloan saw strength with the divisional framework already in 
place and turned GM into a “manufacturing federation.”9  This divisional structure 
allowed for dedicated salespeople and support staff, allowing GM to excel in each of its 
brand offerings.  This also allowed GM to have a car for “every purse and purpose.”  
Sloan wanted each GM brand to have design and engineering autonomy, but needed to 
ensure purchasing would be unaffected by changes within divisions by establishing a 
General Purchasing committee.  The committee consisted of corporate purchasing 
executives and division purchasing staff.10
                                                          
7 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/2001/ 
  This General Purchasing Committee allowed 
Sloan to enjoy economies of scale in volume pricing, and ensure the divisions were not 
8 Marchand, Roland, The Corporation Nobody Knew: Bruce Barton, Alfred Sloan, and the Founding of the 
General Motors "Family” The Business History Review, Vol. 65, No. 4, The Automobile Industry (Winter, 
1991), pp. 825-875  
9 Volti, Rudi Cars and Culture: The Life Story of a Technology, 2004 pg 53 
10 Roland Marchand, The Corporation Nobody Knew: Bruce Barton, Alfred Sloan, and the Founding of the 
General Motors "Family” The Business History Review, Vol. 65, No. 4, The Automobile Industry (Winter, 
1991), pp. 8 
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autonomous in all of their decisions.  With a strong organizational structure in place, 
Sloan next focus was to figure out the best way to sell GM cars to the American public. 
  The automobile was one of the greatest inventions of its time, but creating 
demand for it would be an even bigger innovation.  At the time Sloan came into power in 
1921, General Motors's combined production of all brands was only 13 percent of the 
total production for that year, compared to rival Ford's 61 percent share.11  The total 
amount of automobiles in production at the time still remained small, with only 7.5 
million cars and trucks in the US by 1920.12  Selling cars thus became more important 
than making them.  This led to a change in leadership of automobile manufacturers “from 
the original mechanical wizards like Henry Ford … and the Dodge brothers, who 
invented and figured out how to build the automobile, to men like Alfred P. Sloan … who 
were concerned with defining the automobile’s role in the life of the consumer.”13
                                                          
11 Roland Marchand, The Corporation Nobody Knew: Bruce Barton, Alfred Sloan, and the Founding of the General 
Motors "Family” The Business History Review, Vol. 65, No. 4, The Automobile Industry (Winter, 1991), pp. 7 
  Sloan 
was an innovator in the field of marketing along with his advertising Director Bruce 
Barton.  Sloan did everything he could to position GM ahead of Ford.  Most notably, 
Sloan used his connection with DuPont, the main financial backer of GM at the time to 
innovate in design.  At the time, Ford was maintaining its competitive production 
advantage by producing high volumes of cars at low costs with the assembly line system.  
In order to make cars at such high volume, Ford could only offer cars in black, because 
black lacquer dried the fastest, thus requiring Ford to keep fewer unfinished cars in 
12 Facts and Figures of the Automobile Industry, National Automobile Chamber of Commerce 
http://www.railsandtrails.com/AutoFacts/ Accessed 3/7/2010 
13 http://www.gm.ca/inm/gmcanada/english/about/OverviewHist/hist_auto.html 
Accessed 3/6/2010 
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inventory before shipping them off to dealers.  Sloan knew GM could gain the advantage 
by making cars at low costs in many colors when he used his connection with DuPont to 
gain exclusive access to a fast drying automotive lacquer created in 1922.14
Sloan had other ideas that made him an innovator in marketing.  In 1927 he hired 
Haley Earl, to head the first in-house design team of any major manufacturer.  Sloan also 
created the concept of “planned obsolescence” to sell more cars.  By advertising the 
features of each new model (which consisted mainly of stylistic changes to the interior 
and body) people were compelled to continually trade up despite their already owning a 
perfectly functioning car.  The insignificant changes in each model year significantly 
increased revenues.  Finally, GM was innovative in attracting customers by establishing 
GMAC, a financing arm that allowed customers to buy a car now and pay later; a stark 
contrast to Ford’s cash-only policy.  The increase in demand Sloan created each year 
fueled more production, but the influx of workers led to new concerns. 
  This pleased 
the customer and made Ford look hopelessly antiquated with their offer of a Model T “in 
any color so long as it was black.” 
GM began as a company that cared about its workers, and saw them as an integral 
part of the company.  As a result of their determination to have a strong bond with their 
workers, they paid workers above market wages (as did their leading competitor, Ford), 
and offered health benefits and a defined benefit pension plan.  This kept the workers 
happy and kept productivity up, and if the overwhelming legacy costs and increased unit 
costs per car were a ticking time-bomb, GM never noticed.  GM hit its peak in the 
                                                          
14 Flink, James J. The Car Culture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975 pg 53 
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1940’s-50’s with 40-50% of market share in the US vehicle market.15
GM’s large market share during the period was unsurprising, given how much of 
its inventory was diverted towards producing equipment for the war effort.  Wartime 
manufacturing was a huge boost to GM, and allowed them to hire on more labor to 
increase production.  All of the UAW workers consented to a no-strike policy during 
wartime production to ensure US viability during the war.  The war brought the nation, 
and the corporation, closer together than ever.  Unfortunately, V-J Day brought victory 
only to the US.  With the lack of contracts flowing in, GM would be forced to lay off the 
extra capacity of workers and ramp down operations.
  It appeared as if 
the auto giant were doing everything right. 
16
GM’s relationship with labor is only part of the story of its multiple tipping points 
in its relationships.  Each labor strike did its damage, but the company addressed the 
aftermath of each strike as if it were a discreet event.  Every defect in a car was seen only 
for the defect, not for example, as an opportunity to strengthen internal safety controls so 
that defects did not happen in the future.  The 113-day strike was not treated as an 
  This attempt to return to business 
as usual would result in something far from it.  The 113-day strike of the UAW following 
the loss of military contracts would cripple GM.  The strike would forever color GM’s 
interaction with its labor force.  1945-46 would be to labor what July 1, 2009 was to 
stockholders. 
                                                          
15 http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/225/gm-timeline.html 
Accessed 2/20/2010 
16 Lichtenstein, Nelson Labor’s War at Home: The CIO in WWII Cambridge University Press, 1982 pg 223 
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opportunity to improve labor relations, to discuss what GM needed from workers along 
with what the workers needed from GM. 
GM has weathered storms far worse than the 113-day strike in its corporate 
history, yet still remained one of the highest revenue producing firms for the past 60 
years.  It is an oversimplification to say that the financial crises, and the ensuing 
recession, were the straws that broke the great auto giant’s back.   GM had a series of 
failures with each of its constituent groups, and was unable to address these problems 
until it was too late.  GM is a story of how success can blind an organization to its 
internal failures. 
GM cannot take all of the blame for its failures.  GM fell into the trap that many 
large organizations have: poor stakeholder management.  It isn’t even entirely GM’s fault 
that they poorly managed their stakeholders.  There is a hole in the traditional stakeholder 
management approach.  The two prevailing models are divergent.  One proclaims that the 
corporation should be at the center of its stakeholder web at all times, while the other 
asserts that all stakeholder needs should be met at all times.  Both models are entirely 
unattainable for a real world firm in a dynamic environment.  A more nuanced approach 
is optimal, and can lead to a successful company regardless of the current business cycle.  
General Motors is the ideal case model because it exemplifies poor interaction at every 
level with stakeholders, but that is not to say that other corporations do not suffer from 
the same problems that plagued what was once the highest revenue producing corporation 
in the world.  The failures at GM should be viewed as an opportunity for careful strategic 
13 
 
planners at other firms to mend and forge stakeholder relationships, reorient their 
organizational structure to meet their corporate goals, and understand when they have 
reached a tipping point and how to recover. 
Chapter two will answer the question of what is a stakeholder, and what questions 
traditional stakeholder theory can answer.  Chapter three details the case selection 
methodology and research methods employed in writing this thesis.  Chapter four is a 
results section covering GM’s dominant stakeholders, and when and how each 
relationship went out of control.  Chapter five is a discussion detailing what can be 
learned from each stakeholder interaction, and how another firm could predict the results 
of their stakeholder relationships and how to optimize them.  Chapter six is a conclusion 
discussing how future research could shed light on the firm-stakeholder management 
interaction. 
  
14 
 
Chapter 2: Theory 
The prevailing theory of corporate resource allocation in the dawn of corporations 
was to maximize owner wealth.  The largest companies, or combinations, were merely 
vehicles by which owner-entrepreneurs could maximize their own returns.  The Dutch 
East India Company was the first company to be publicly traded, issuing stocks as early 
as 1602.17  The company paid dividends as high as 18%, making shareholders of the day 
quite happy.  Corporate decisions of publicly traded companies were made with the sole 
intention of how to repay their backers.  As corporations desired new sources of funds 
beyond owners and debt, they sought out equity financing by utilizing a stock offering to 
the public.  Companies then had available to them large amounts of capital opportunities.  
The birth of publicly traded corporations and the retirement of owners like Carnegie and 
Rockefeller gave rise to a new form of managerial capitalism.  Investors who had 
invested in the managerial genius of someone since retired were concerned that the new 
management would not adequately represent their monetary interests in the firm.  Berle 
and Means are concerned about agency theory within the corporation, wherein the goals 
of the directors of the firm do not align with the owners.18
 
  It is the desire of the owners 
of the firm to assert the priority of their needs over those of the directors.  It is this shift 
that turned the “maximize shareholder wealth” mantra into the law. 
 
                                                          
17 http://www.exchange-handbook.co.uk/index.cfm?section=articles&action=detail&id=60613 
Accessed 4/13/2010 
18 Berle, Adolph, Means, Gardiner, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1991 
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A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.  The powers 
of the directors are to be employed for that end.  The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice 
of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or 
to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.19
Judge’s statement in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 
 
The court ruling came about in unique circumstances.  Henry Ford had announced there 
would no longer be any special dividends, despite a cash surplus of over $50,000,000.  
He intended instead to reinvest the surplus in the operations of the company.  This 
angered the shareholders who claimed “the assets of the company representing its surplus 
is as much the property of the stockholders as the assets representing the capital stock and 
the stockholders are as much entitled to a dividend that will give them returns on their 
surplus investment as their capital stock.”20  The maximize shareholder wealth law with 
the distribution of special dividends came with the interpretation of Hunter v. Roberts 
wherein “courts of equity will not interfere in the management of directors unless it is 
clearly made to appear that they are guilty of fraud or misappropriation of the corporate 
funds, or refuse to declare a dividend when the corporation has a surplus of net profits 
which it can, without detriment to its business, divide among its stockholders, and when a 
refusal to do so would amount to such an abuse of discretion as would constitute a fraud, 
or breach of that good faith which they are bound to exercise towards the stockholders.”21
                                                          
19 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) 
  
Hunter v. Roberts clearly implies that Ford’s withholding of surplus cash to reinvest in 
the business constitutes fraud, and thus the ruling in Dodge v. Ford where the maximize 
shareholder wealth mantra and dictate was born. 
20 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.  170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) 
21 Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 83 Mich. 63, 71, 47 N. W. 131, 134 
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This maximizing shareholder wealth model was seen as the ideal for years, but it 
has many flaws.  If the goal of an organization is primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders, it calls into question the notion of how long a stockholder is interested in 
the success of the company – or its success at all.  While it may be in the best interest of a 
short-term stockholder for the company to pay a large dividend at the end of the year, it 
might be in the best interest of the company, or a long-term stockholder, to reinvest those 
funds into business operations.  This is the dichotomy evidenced in Dodge v. Ford where 
ford cared about the long-term success of the business while the stockholders cared about 
their short term profits.  This set the precedent where any investment in company 
operations instead of investment into the pockets of the stockholders could be interpreted 
as putting the goals of the corporation ahead of the goals of the stockholders.  Defining 
which stockholders, those investing in the short run, or those who desire to hold stock in 
their portfolio for decades is a complex decision few corporations understood they 
needed to consider. 
This time-horizon issue also can hamper long-term strategy.  Companies may plan 
to make investments into plants, parts, and equipment, or research and development; each 
of which may have a high return on investment.  Unfortunately for the stockholders, this 
return may not be realized for 10, 30, or even 100 years.  Larger structural problems can 
result in problems with the stockholder approach.  A recent example would be the hostile 
takeover of Budweiser by InBev.  InBev had plans to buy Budweiser, and when 
Budweiser declined, InBev took their argument directly to Budweiser’s stockholders, 
who found that their wealth was maximized by having InBev, a Belgian company, take 
17 
 
over what was the largest US-owned brewery.  Making a decision to maximize 
shareholder wealth transferred Budweiser’s shareholder’s loyalties to InBev.  At best, the 
shareholder approach can limit strategic options for a corporation; at its worst, 
maximizing shareholder wealth can lead to a hostile takeover. 
One of the biggest critiques of the maximizing shareholder wealth model is that it 
cannot address many of the problems the firm faces.  Determining a supplier is not a 
question shareholder wealth can answer, nor is how to manage labor relations or how to 
deal with new government policy.  The shareholder wealth model does not answer all of 
the questions facing a firm.  Determining which shareholder’s needs are the most 
important is a tiny part of the decisions a corporation faces.  Corporations are constantly 
working with, and against, many different groups, both inside and outside the corporation.  
On any given day a company may interact with suppliers, customers, government 
regulators, distributors, and countless other groups.  Those entities the company interacts 
with are described with the blanket term “stakeholder.”  In its simplest application, a 
stakeholder is any group or entity that has a stake in the organization.  It is, however, 
impossible for a large corporation to interact on a meaningful level with every group that 
claims to have a stake in the corporation.  This sets the scene for the emergence of 
stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholder Theory: 
Stakeholder management theory is the study of how a firm or organization 
interacts with those groups who it affects.  This theory tries to shed light into how a 
18 
 
corporation handles all groups affected, or affecting the organization.  Stakeholder 
research refutes the notion that the goal of any corporation is to maximize shareholder 
wealth.  In its many forms, it states that the best way for an organization to not only 
survive, but thrive, is to look at all parts of the organization and its surroundings.  The 
difficulty is determining which parts of the organization are most important. 
One cannot begin to manage stakeholders before it understands what a 
stakeholder is.  Freeman has a broad definition of a stakeholder, and claims “a 
stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the achievement of the organizations objectives.”  This all encompassing 
definition is both accurate and useless for large organizations with many constituent 
groups.  Defining a stakeholder needs to be the first step for any organization. 
Mitchell, Agle, Wood provide a table of definitions from different sources of who 
is defined as a stakeholder: 
19 
 
 
Table 1: Stakeholder Definitions 
Source: Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle and Donna J. Wood. Toward a Theory of Stakeholder 
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, The 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 1997), pp. 853-886  
Normative: 
20 
 
Donaldson and Preston believe that stakeholder theory is at its core normative.  
They attempt to make stakeholder theory more applicable to corporations by narrowing 
the definition of who constitutes a viable stakeholder.  To validate their normative 
concept of stakeholders, two ideas must be held to be true: 
(a) Stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of 
corporate activity.  Stakeholders are identified by their interests in the corporation, whether the corporation 
has any corresponding functional interest in them. 
(b) The interests of all stakeholders are of intrinsic value.  That is, each group of stakeholders merits 
consideration for its own sake and not merely because of its ability to further the interests of some group, 
such as the shareowners.22
 
 
This normative description of a stakeholder is open to as much interpretation as 
Freeman’s vague definition of a stakeholder.  It is a recursive cycle wherein only those 
stakeholders defined as having “legitimate interests” have “intrinsic value.”  Of course a 
stakeholder with a legitimate interest in the firm would be deemed of intrinsic value.  It is 
determining those stakeholders with legitimate interest that is the difficulty of most 
organizations, and how much value to place on the needs, wants, and conflicting claims 
of each stakeholder is what leads a company to become successful.  It is not the 
normative approach, but the instrumental approach to stakeholder management that will 
be of most utility to a corporation.  Donaldson and Preston explain “the instrumental uses 
of stakeholder theory make a connection between stakeholder approaches and commonly 
desired objectives such as profitability.”23
                                                          
22 Donaldson and Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and 
Implications.  The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No 1 (Jan., 1995) pg 67 
  Unfortunately, instrumental stakeholder 
theory must follow some sort of normative stakeholder identification before progress can 
23 Donaldson and Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and 
Implications.  The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No 1 (Jan., 1995) pg 71 
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be made into stakeholder management.  Understanding the stakeholders that can lead the 
organization to greater profitability, and predicting their effects on the corporation, is 
what gives utility to stakeholder theory and its use in the modern corporation.  Identifying 
a stakeholder is the vital first step in the process of employing stakeholder theory to 
advance a corporation and analyze its failures. 
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood analyze the stakeholder identification further with a 
“normative theory of stakeholder identification, to explain logically why managers 
should consider certain classes of entities as stakeholders.”24  They understand that 
identifying stakeholders is the first step, but their argument rests on the notion that 
corporations should always be at the center of the firm, and their negative lens on 
stakeholders limits their ability to analyze the positive effects can have on a corporation.  
Their word choice indicates a management bias in interacting with stakeholders.  The 
three variables they describe as being important in identifying and prioritizing 
stakeholder classes are: “(1) The stakeholder’s power to influence the firm, (2) the 
legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the firm, and (3) the urgency of the 
stakeholders claim on the firm.”25
                                                          
24 Mitchell, Agle, Wood.  Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the 
Principle of Who and What Really Counts.  Academy of Management Review, 1997, Vol. 22, No. 4, pg 853 
  Despite the negative connotations of Mitchell, Agle, 
Woods word choice, they have developed a useful method of managing stakeholders, but 
it is one of many methods that a corporation should employ.  Limiting a corporation to 
employing only one stakeholder management policy can prevent it from attaining long 
term profitability and can cause it to have detrimental stakeholder relationships.  Missing 
25 Mitchell, Agle, Wood.  Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the 
Principle of Who and What Really Counts.  Academy of Management Review, 1997, Vol. 22, No. 4, pg 854 
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in this theory is a dynamic approach not only over time, but of dynamic stakeholder 
management theories used over time to most efficiently manage relationships with 
stakeholders depending on the current business conditions and the expectations of future 
business conditions from strategic planning. 
Descriptive: 
The power theory is of more utility, and is the most often utilized for firms 
identifying stakeholders.  Pfeffer’s resource dependence theory best explains how 
stakeholders achieve their power: the stakeholders who control needed resources for the 
firm gain power because of the power differential with the firm.26
Legitimacy is a less useful metric in indentifying stakeholders.  Legitimacy is also 
employed in the Donaldson and Preston normative identification scheme.  Legitimacy is 
a firm determined variable that can vary.  In essence, a stakeholder can have significant 
power, and deem their concern as urgent, but it is up to the firm to determine how 
legitimate they see the concern of the stakeholder.  It is the discretionary aspect of the 
firm, in combination with the emphasis of firm centrality in stakeholder identification 
that lead to problems with this theory. 
  An example of a 
stakeholder who attained power through the application of resource dependence theory 
would be the United Auto Worker’s Union (UAW). 
A more realistic stakeholder identification theory needs to be employed for a real 
world corporation.  Missing in the stakeholder literature is a dynamic theory wherein the 
                                                          
26 Pfeffer, J. 1981.  Power in Organizations.  Marshfield, MA: Pitman 
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firm can change who it deems a stakeholder over time based on changing business 
conditions and firm strategic goals.  This dynamic model will allow a firm to change who 
it identifies as stakeholders over time depending on how the firm perceives the goals of 
the stakeholder will align with the goals of the corporation.  Applying an instrumental 
stakeholder approach to identification (wherein stakeholders would be identified based on 
their effects, i.e. effects on profitability), with a dynamic approach to identification that 
equates stakeholder legitimacy to metrics across the life of the firm will allow a firm to 
better manage who it deems stakeholders.   
Managing what an organization defines as its stakeholders is the next step.  How 
to interact with which stakeholder group is what drives the majority of stakeholder theory 
research.  Both highly positive, and highly negative, theories about stakeholder 
management exist and are put into practice in major organizations.  It is impossible and 
impractical to satisfy even the needs of legitimate stakeholders identified by the 
corporation all at once.  Differing theories exist on how to manage stakeholder 
relationships. 
There exists an organizational approach to stakeholder management, and Rowley 
has continued the prevailing model that stakeholders should be feared and can only 
negatively influence an organization.  In Rowley’s Academy of Management Review 
piece on Stakeholder Influence, he discusses “… the structure of an organization’s 
stakeholder relationships affect its response to stakeholder pressures” [Rowley 888].  
Structure is an important aspect of the relationship, and will be discussed later in this 
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section under organizational management and the effects of organizational structure on 
stakeholder management.   
Rowley also argues “the density of the stakeholder network surrounding an 
organization and the organization’s centrality in the network influence its degree of 
resistance to stakeholder demands” [Rowley 888].  The word resistance carries a 
negative connotation, and assumes that any attempt by a stakeholder to voice their 
opinion is something to be stymied at all costs.  If an organization wants to remain at the 
center of their network, the organization will attempt to reduce the density of their 
stakeholder network.  The lower the density of the network, the harder it is for 
stakeholders to communicate with each other.  This “density reduction” strategy is put 
into place in many companies.  Companies think that the less an individual stakeholder 
knows about an organizational policy or future practice, the less able they will be to resist 
the policy.  This stakeholder management policy addresses only half of the issue.  
Rowley’s theory pushes stakeholders away from the center, but the real issue lies with 
how well connected each stakeholder group is to one another.  Even if a company can 
successfully push away any stakeholders from the center of the organization, it does not 
address the issue of stakeholders linking together to form a stronger strategic alliance.  
The stakeholder interactions outside the direct firm network can have a greater effect than 
in-network interactions.  Moreover, Rowley’s negative reinforcement strategy of dealing 
with stakeholders can lead to greater fundamental issues with how stakeholders are 
defined and interact with the organization.  The detriments of an organization pushing 
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away its stakeholders have led to more work in the field of stakeholder to management to 
improve relations. 
Philips attempts to improve the stakeholder management model by including 
ethics to limit the negative impact of corporations on individual stakeholder groups.  
Philips sees stakeholder management theory as “the theory of organizational management 
and ethics.”27  He expands upon his ethical treatment of stakeholder management to 
include fair treatment of workers.  Philips describes his definition of fairness as 
“Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually 
beneficial scheme of cooperation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the 
participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding, obligations of fairness are 
created among the participants in the cooperative scheme in proportion to the benefits 
accepted.”28
  Recently, the case for stakeholder collaboration has been furthered by Freeman in 
his book 
  Philips is moving in a new direction in approaching the topic of working 
together with stakeholders.  It is unlikely in a bargaining arrangement with a stakeholder 
that attempts to be fair are even discussed.  It is more typical that a firm falls prey to the 
prisoner’s dilemma, wherein both sides chose to win at the expense of the other, each 
losing in the process.  While fairness would be ideal in all interactions, it is unlikely to 
happen due to a disparity in power between the bargaining parties involved.  Philips, 
however, is moving in a new direction towards collaborative stakeholder management. 
Managing for Stakeholders. 
                                                          
27 Phillips, Robert.  Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Ethics, Berret-Koehler Publishers 2003 
 He makes the case for collaborating with 
28 Philips, Robert A., Stakeholder Theory and a Principle of Fairness.  Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 
1 (Jan 1997) pg. 57 
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stakeholders and paints a far rosier stakeholder picture than most stakeholder theorists.  
Freeman talks about creating value for stakeholders, claiming “executives need to 
understand in detail each stakeholder’s: (I) actual or current behavior; (2) its cooperative 
potential, or how it could help a firm achieve its purpose, and (3) its competitive threat, 
how it could prevent a firm from achieving its purpose.”29
There are flaws in Freeman’s idealized logic.  Stakeholder collaboration is not the 
same thing as stakeholder prioritization.  It is not always possible to collaborate with all 
stakeholders, at times the needs of one group need to be prioritized over the needs of 
another, depending on the conditions a business is facing, and this concept is not fully 
addressed in Freeman’s tome.  Moreover, Freeman claims “a stakeholder in an 
organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organizations objectives.”
  Freeman sees proper 
stakeholder management as an issue of leadership, and sees leadership style and tone as 
the best way to interact with stakeholders. 
30
                                                          
29 Freeman, Edward R. etc.  Managing for Stakeholders: Survival, Reputation, and Success. Yale University 
Press 2007 pg 15 
  This broad stakeholder view, combined 
with the desire to satisfy all of these stakeholders at the same time, is both unattainable 
and undesirable for a real world firm.  Moreover, leadership styles do not address, and 
many times do not change, fundamental inadequacies in the organizational structure that 
may have caused poor stakeholder relationships. 
30 Freeman, Edward R. etc.  Managing for Stakeholders: Survival, Reputation, and Success. Yale University 
Press 2007 
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The desire of Rowley to push stakeholders away and the desire of Freeman to 
unite all stakeholders together expose the gaping hole in stakeholder management theory.  
The two prevailing models are divergent.  One proclaims that the corporation should be 
at the center of its stakeholder web at all times, while the other asserts that all stakeholder 
needs should be met at all times.  Both models are entirely unattainable for a real world 
firm in a dynamic environment.  A more nuanced approach is optimal, and can lead to a 
successful company regardless of the current business cycle.  Corporations need to define 
internal criteria to determine which stakeholders should be kept at arm’s length, and 
which are viable partners for collaboration.  Moreover, the stakeholder relationship 
should be constantly changing and evolving.  Just as what was good for the business ten 
years ago may not be best for it ten years from now, its stakeholder relationships should 
not remain static.  This is where strategic planning and organizational theory must 
combine with stakeholder management. 
The study of what constitutes a stakeholder must also be augmented by 
organizational theory.  Part of the goal of organizational theory research is to examine the 
structure of an organization to see how an organization can and should interact with 
stakeholders, based on the firm’s interpretation who they define as a stakeholder.  
Stakeholder recognition and an organizational framework which allows a firm to interact 
with stakeholder groups according to its internal goals and objectives are vital to the 
success of any firm.   
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Organizations need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of their 
organizational structure in how they interact with stakeholders.  Many different 
organizational structures exist in large corporations.  A “flat” organization is one that has 
little, if any, hierarchical structure in place, where all workers are on roughly the same 
level.  This structure can help to empower workers, but the lack of formal authority 
figures may make it difficult to effect change at different levels of the organization.  The 
majority of organizations are not flat.  They typically have a rigidly-defined hierarchy 
typically emblazoned on an organizational chart distributed throughout the office.  This 
structure can include many different divisions with shared functional departments, such 
as shared accounting or legal resources. 
There may be an ideal organizational structure for any organization at a certain 
point in its lifetime, but there is no organizational structure that can remain unchanged for 
decades and still allow a company to function at optimal efficiency.  This is the trap that 
large firms seem unable to extricate themselves from.  Chandler in his tome on the great 
leaders of organizations in the early part of the 1900’s wrote best about the changing 
needs of organizations, stating “the failure to develop a new internal structure, like the 
failure to respond to new external opportunities and needs , was a consequence of 
overconcentration on operational activities by the executives responsible for the destiny 
of their enterprises, or from their inability, because of past training and education and 
present position, to develop an entrepreneurial outlook.”31
                                                          
31 Chandler Jr., Alfred D. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial 
Enterprise.  The MIT Press, 1962.  Page 16 
  Many companies suffer this 
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problem, when they face “periods of momentum in which there was a reluctance to 
tamper with well tried formulas, and the effects of cognitive limitations and the nature of 
power and ideology constrained attempts at change.”32
A successful organization should be able to systematically identify its 
stakeholders and manage its relationships with them throughout time by changing its 
organizational structure and aligning its relationships with its strategic plan.  A failing 
organization is mired in the past with an unchanging organizational structure, and an 
unwillingness to meet the needs of a changing marketplace. 
  Ideology is a word that should 
stand out.  It is the ideology of a company in the form of leadership, as Freeman 
discusses, or in the form of a corporate mission statement which drives the internal and 
external impression of the firm.  It is important for an organization to understand how its 
corporate culture can affect how it interacts with stakeholders. 
The analysis of General Motors that follows is a case study of the latter. 
  
                                                          
32 Faulkner, David. Strategy: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, Volume 1, Routledge, 
2002. Pg 9 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The next step in the process of testing the application of stakeholder theory is case 
selection and determination of how to collect data to obtain relevant repeatable results. 
Research Design: 
The purpose of this single case study is to refine and refocus the theory to make it 
more relevant to large corporations.  Single case theory is ideal to test stakeholder 
management theory.  Yin describes the use of a critical case “To confirm, challenge, or 
extend the theory, there may exist a single case, meeting all of the conditions for testing 
the theory.  The single case can then be used to determine whether a theory’s propositions 
are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant.”33
The current research on stakeholder theory is inadequate.  The existing theories 
are either inapplicable to a real world firm, or will lead to failure if and when they are 
applied.  A full understanding of why these theories cannot work is necessary to 
demonstrate that there is room in the field of stakeholder management for a practical 
approach.  Moreover, these theories lack relevance if they cannot be applied to a firm.  
Their claim at being universally applicable can be easily disproved by testing them at a 
single firm.  Moreover, in order to test these theories against each other it is necessary to 
analyze their use within a single firm.  Comparing the stakeholder management approach 
of one firm to another firm managing a different type of stakeholder with a different 
  
Stakeholder theory is the ideal theory to be tested using a critical case methodology.   
                                                          
33 Yin, Robert K.  Case Study Research: Design and Methods.  Applied Social Research Methods Series, Vol. 
5, Sage Publications, 1994, pg 38. 
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theory will produce irrelevant results.  Cross firm analysis comparing differing theories 
cannot prove the flaws of a single theory.  Studying a large firm with a well documented 
history of stakeholder interaction, and comparing the treatment of one stakeholder group 
to another will demonstrate the flaws in the current stakeholder theories.  For these 
reasons, the most relevant data will be obtained from a single case study. 
Determining the critical case to test stakeholder theory did not prove difficult.  I 
have selected General Motors to study this theory.  There are several reasons for this 
choice.  First, General Motors is one of the largest corporations in American history, if 
stakeholder theory does not apply to General Motors, than it does not work for a smaller 
corporation.  Second, General Motors has a long and well-documented history spanning 
both bull and bear market times in the United States.  The fact that General Motors has 
survived throughout many business conditions makes it particularly interesting to analyze 
over the course of the spectrum of business conditions.  A corporation with a shorter 
history only having survived during part of an economic cycle may give skewed results 
as to the effectiveness of stakeholder theory.  A study of the corporation can lend insight 
into other large corporations.  General Motors recently made headlines by declaring 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.    The company was in the top 10 in the Fortune 500 rankings 
every year since the inception of the ranking.  How a company can have higher revenues 
than any other company in the world for such a long time, yet buckle under the costs of 
continuing as a company is indicative of substantial flaws in the application and 
understanding of stakeholder management.  Under Yin’s definition of a single case study, 
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General Motors Corporation can be seen as the critical case in this context.  Its visibility, 
size, and history make it ideal. 
Selecting a case, just like identifying a stakeholder, is only the first step in the 
methodological process.  This will be an embedded, single-case design, a type of single 
case design which involves several sub-units of analysis.34
It is most relevant in stakeholder theory to use a longitudinal approach, wherein a 
single firm’s interaction with a stakeholder is analyzed over time to see if there are 
changes in interaction patterns.  This will bring to light flaws in the current stakeholder 
management practices, and a longitudinal approach to stakeholder management using the 
methodology described later is replicable to any other firm.  The change over time in 
interaction can bring greater insight into the theory.   
  The embedded, single-case 
design makes more sense for analyzing stakeholder theory then the holistic approach.  
The embedded approach allows analysis on different sublevels, such as the sublevel of 
GM stakeholders (the government, UAW), stakeholders of those stakeholder groups 
(workers, taxpayers and consumers), and a broad view with General Motors itself treated 
as a stakeholder.  This allows an in depth analysis of not only the evolution of 
stakeholder theory application at a single company, but stakeholder theory at the different 
levels of a corporation. 
                                                          
34 Yin, Robert K.  Case Study Research: Design and Methods.  Applied Social Research Methods Series, Vol. 
5, Sage Publications, 1994, pg 42. 
 
33 
 
It is impossible to fully analyze every stakeholder in an organization.  The 
purpose of this single-case study on General Motors is to analyze the current stakeholder 
management theories, determine if General Motors applied the theories in any consistent 
matter, and see if a more appropriate theory exists.  An analysis of any large corporation 
employing the methodology set forth would demonstrate the same holes in stakeholder 
theory.  GM was selected not merely for its size, as any other large corporation could 
have been selected, but because it has a well-documented history and its recent 
bankruptcy and the confusion over its failure makes it a company of particular cultural 
relevance to study. 
Data Collection: 
General Motors has many tiers and types of stakeholders.  To simplify the issue of 
stakeholder analysis and identification to a more manageable scope it is necessary to 
examine a subset of the stakeholders within the organization.  The following 
methodology is applicable to any single case study of a large organization.   
General Motors has consistently high revenues compared to the auto industry, yet 
has low or negative profitability compared to the industry as a whole.  In order to analyze 
this main financial issue of the company, only the stakeholders contributing the most to 
the company’s costs will be analyzed.  While other stakeholders may have an effect on 
the organization, before the company can regain profitability, it needs to understand the 
origins of its high costs.  This methodology could be applied to find the stakeholder 
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management problems with another company by selecting and analyzing the stakeholders 
that generate the highest costs (or most significantly reduce revenues) for that company. 
Analysis: 
The stakeholder which contributes most to General Motor’s costs is labor.  Its 
workforce and correspondingly the UAW are therefore analyzed as a key stakeholder in 
this study.  Stakeholder interaction will be analyzed over the history of the UAW in its 
interactions with General Motors, and with other companies such as Ford and Chrysler in 
so much as how they affect General Motors.  To analyze the change in relationship, the 
UAW pattern bargaining agreements and contracts will be examined to see wage changes 
and bargaining term evolution throughout the company’s history.  This interaction will be 
analyzed to see if the promises made on either side can be explained with an existing 
stakeholder theory, or if the existing theories furthered the problems between the two 
organizations.  Stakeholder collaboration with the UAW can also be compared to pension 
funding levels compared with industry average over the period.  This metric defines the 
strength of General Motors promise to the union and how seriously they consider their 
obligations.  A qualitative measure to the interaction between the company and the UAW 
will be analyzed with the press releases of both GM and UAW executives to determine if 
language usage and patterns can explain underlying sentiments of the two organizations. 
The government contributes directly and indirectly to General Motor’s costs.  
Corporate tax is seen to be irrelevant in this work, as all corporations throughout different 
industries are subject to the tax and thus it does not show a trait unique to tax policy 
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within General Motors.  The governments more indirect impact on cost comes from 
NHTSA requirements.  This thesis will use historical legal action between GM and 
NHTSA to determine the effectiveness of the organization and its strength in influencing 
General Motors.  Additionally, it will be worthwhile to see if there is a cost increase per 
car after major NHTSA legislation is enacted. 
A timeline of important events in the auto industry in addition to company stock 
prices correlated to the Dow Jones Industrial Index will be compared to see if negative 
stakeholder interactions can be correlated to business cycle changes.  This will serve as a 
control variable to determine the effects of the economy on stakeholder decisions. 
A longitudinal approach is the best way to analyze the aforementioned 
stakeholder interactions.  Historical interactions across the lifetime of the company will 
be analyzed among each stakeholder and compared on a decade by decade time frame.  
This way the stakeholders can be compared against each other and across time to 
determine if any prioritization patterns develop.  A longitudinal approach is the simplest 
and most replicable approach for a single case study on a large firm with a long history. 
Next is a qualitative approach analyzing the annual reports and press releases 
from PR Newswire and corporate releases to analyze the language used and the implicit 
thoughts about stakeholder interactions and relationships.   
The analysis methods to study each stakeholder studied in this thesis will be 
combined to compare stakeholder interactions throughout each time period.  It will be 
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interesting to determine if there is a stakeholder prioritization pattern, or if the 
interactions drove the business to increase revenues or reduce costs.   
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Chapter Four: Results 
The purpose of this section is to analyze interactions between GM and its 
stakeholders to determine the inadequacies with current stakeholder theory.  The 
stakeholder interactions will be analyzed over time to determine which stakeholder 
theories were enacted in differing periods, and analyze any transitions.  The discussion 
section that follows will give further analysis of how stakeholder theory and stakeholder 
management needs to be expanded to suit the needs of modern corporations, and the 
conclusion section will discuss areas of further research that can lend further insight into 
the stakeholder arena. 
The lack of a dynamic stakeholder management strategy in the early part of the 
company’s history has led to a consistent reduction in profitability from which the 
company could not recover.  The analysis of the annual reports from 1986-2009 
demonstrates the effects of changing government accounting policies, leading GM to 
present themselves in a more favorable way to shareholders, the problems associated with 
the UAW’s dominance over the corporation, the increasing regulatory burden from the 
NHTSA and the company’s own desire to increase the amount of automobile offerings, 
and how the company could possibly not have noticed how quickly they were failing. 
 
Founding – 1950: Paternalism 
Alfred Sloan appeared to have a paternalistic approach to his workers.  He, like 
Henry Ford, applied the high wage doctrine to his worker payment structure.  Withers 
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first expressed the high-wage doctrine in 1914, explaining “it is to the interest of all 
shareholders -- or whoever it may be that takes the surplus profit of an industry -- that the 
workers of all other industries should be better paid, because thereby an enormous body 
of people with money to spend would be given more money to spend.... For the slice 
taken out of profits would be more than made up by the bigger turnover and bigger 
profits to be got owing to the wider and keener demand by a large body of better paid 
workers.”35
It should come as no surprise that GM’s payment structure was dictated by the 
actions of another automaker.  GM and Ford influenced and were influenced by the 
actions of the other for as long as they have both been in existence.  It is the competitor as 
a stakeholder that has been overlooked in much of the literature on stakeholder theory.  
Initially the GM – Ford stakeholder linkage was limited to market share competition.  
GM came to dominate Ford in the late 1920’s when customers grew tired of Ford’s single 
model offering.  Ford had dedicated all of his factory resources toward producing a single 
car, the model T.  When customers grew a taste to the wide variety of market offerings 
from GM, Ford had to go through an expensive retooling process to make the model A in 
their factories to suit customer needs.  It was Sloan’s organizational design to have the 
“GM organization designers separate[d] and differentiate[d] the company according to 
  Ford initially implemented the wage increases to workers, and GM followed 
shortly after to remain competitive against Ford’s wage structure.   
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the strategy of serving different markets.”36
“We said first that the corporation should produce a line of cars in each price area, 
from the lowest price up to one for a strictly high grade, quantity production car, but we 
would not get into the fierce price field with small production; second, that the price steps 
should not be such as to leave wide gaps in the line, and yet should be great enough to 
keep their number within reason, so that the greatest advantage of quantity production 
could be secured; and third, that there should be no duplication by the corporation in 
price fields or steps.”
  Sloan’s innovation with introducing GMAC 
to change customer perception about price and his concept of planned obsolescence to 
change customer perception about how to sell cars helped GM claim majority market 
share over Ford.  Sloan strived to have GM overshadow Ford, and he successfully 
positioned GM as a company with a car “for every purse and purpose.”  This striving to 
overshadow the company, however, would lead to closer ties between the organizations 
than normal.  Sloan innovated across the business to gain customers and have them grow 
with the company, in contrast to Ford’s strategy of forcing customers to grow to like only 
one car, the model T.  Sloan’s policy to encourage customers to grow up along the GM 
product line offerings was threefold: 
37
It is Sloan’s greatest successes in the pre-war era that would open the door for 
subsequent managers to fail.  The decentralized organizational structure was lauded along 
with the “car for every purse and purchase,” but the combination of the two would pose 
problems.  The lack of direct oversight and communication with the designers was seen 
as an asset until each division decided to maximize its own wealth, as opposed to the 
wealth of the firm.  The divisions began to compete for market share, and subsequent 
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managers did not adequately manage this competition, as demonstrated in the graph at the 
end of this section illustrating the redundancies in vehicle offerings at the same price by 
2008. 
While Sloan was busy trying to align the product offerings of GM with the goals 
of the customer, labor was beginning to feel neglected in the competition.  High wages 
alone were not enough to keep labor happy following the depression.  Labor unrest over 
work conditions and the desire for higher wages would lead workers to try to band 
together to bargain for their collective good. 
The National Industry Recovery Act was the first government action to lead the 
way to union formation.  Section 7a of the act “guaranteed the right to bargain 
collectively through representatives chosen by the members without employer 
interference.”38
The National Industry Recovery Act led the way to employee organization at 
unprecedented levels, most notably in the auto industry.  The auto workers union wanted 
  This showed the stakeholder-interaction between the Government and 
what would become the UAW.  The stakeholder interactions forming outside of the firm 
were as important to the corporation as any internal interaction, yet they received less 
attention from management than internal issues.  A stronger lobbying arm may have 
limited the detrimental effects of union formation, but a strong management team could 
have mitigated the effects of union lobbying in their interaction with GM each contract 
year.   
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to retain the strength against the large companies they felt oppressed them, and felt their 
large size and organization could be an advantage to them in political lobbying.  The 
UAW was increasing its power and visibility with the government well before it tried to 
exert its strength on the Big Three. 
The labor union had a high level of interconnectedness with the government early 
on.  The UAW worked together heavily with the Roosevelt Administration, and gave the 
Democratic Party strong political support.39
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  This conferred mutual benefit to both 
organizations.  It allowed the democrats to have the strong political backing of the union.  
It gave the union the democrat’s political power to fight the republicans, who mainly 
favored the needs of big business.  This strong degree of interconnectedness between two 
of GM’s major stakeholders went overlooked for too long.  The stakeholder network 
discussed by Rowley was already forming outside of the corporation before it was fully 
integrated within the organization.  His treatment of stakeholder theory does not 
adequately address issues with networks outside of the firm.  Moreover, the government 
– UAW stakeholder relationship and how it affects the firm is not fully addressed by any 
existing stakeholder theory.  The fact the GM attempted to manage their stakeholders 
after the legalization of the maximize shareholder wealth doctrine with the Rowley model 
would prove problematic.  It was not only GM’s direct network, but the network 
developing around it that was beginning to exert the greatest pressures. 
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The UAW meanwhile was quickly gaining legitimacy with the government and 
already affecting policy decisions, but it felt it needed to exert its urgency in the form of a 
large-scale strike for GM to recognize its legitimacy as a stakeholder of the organization.  
The strike began because GM had forced what would become the UAW to bargain at the 
individual plant level, as opposed to GM as a whole, according to the collective 
bargaining policy already in place at GM.  The UAW disagreed with this policy, stating 
“the principal issues it wished to discuss with the company – recognition for collective 
bargaining, seniority rights, minimum wages, and the speed of the production line – were 
national in scope and must consequently be dealt with by union and management 
representatives for GM as a whole.”40  GM tried to assert dominance over the UAW 
strike by attempting to “block food shipments into the plant, turned off the heat, and 
called in the police (who used tear gas and billy clubs) and tried to use court injunctions 
to remove striking workers from plant premises.”41
The 1937 wildcat sit-down strike led GM to formally recognize the UAW in 1937, 
but GM has never accurately recognized the power it had over the auto giant over the 
decades. General Motors seemed to feel prior to the strike, and to some degree following 
it, that if they treated the workers fairly that the UAW would not retaliate or bargain for 
  All of this was to no avail.  The sit-
down strike would strike fear in the hearts of GM executives for years.  The striking 
workers finally convinced GM to give into their demands and recognize the UAW as the 
only bargaining authority to bargain on the behalf of GM workers. 
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their direct benefit.  Philips fairness model and Freeman’s collaboration efforts would 
prove futile in the early dealings with the UAW.  The fairness model for stakeholder 
theory did not work well in conjunction with a stakeholder group (the UAW) that used 
the urgency of a strike to emphasize their power and legitimacy.  The union was also 
backed by the power of the government in recognizing the union’s ability to form.  At 
this point in history, the UAW was relatively powerful in comparison to General Motors, 
but it was their perceived power, in the form of supposed willingness to strike that made 
GM attempt to prioritize them.  GM attempted fairness with their paternalistic model to 
the union.  GM’s stakeholder goals for the union were different than the goals the union 
had, thus GM needed to find a more effective way to interact with the union.  This 
dynamic approach to union collaboration would occur decades later, only years prior to 
GM’s bankruptcy.  This last ditch effort to save the company is underscored by the fact 
GM only first discussed the importance of organizational change in their 1988 Annual 
Report. 
Following the wildcat strikes, the UAW wanted to increase their urgency with the 
firm using the stakeholder network approach.  “Direct shop floor activity legitimized the 
union’s presence for thousands of previously hesitant workers who now poured into 
union ranks; such job actions established a pattern of union influence and authority 
unrecognized in the early, sketchily written contracts … they demanded constant 
attention for their problems and had the ability to reinforce their demands by group 
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action.”42
General Motors appeared unable to control the greater power attained by the 
union after the wildcat strikes, and attempted to use the fairness model again when 
bargaining with the UAW during WWII.  Prior to the war, GM had reached an agreement 
with the UAW, with the backing of the government, that there were to be no strikes 
during the war so that production could remain high to suit the needs of the soldiers.  
While they were supplying the war abroad, the battle lines were being drawn within the 
company. 
  When GM buckled and allowed collective union bargaining, it strengthened 
the ties not only within the corporation, but also allowed the organization to gain greater 
strength and visibility outside of the network, most notably to other affected stakeholders 
of the UAW, most notably Ford and Chrysler. 
 
The 113-day strike following the loss of military contracts after the war would 
cripple GM.  The pain trickled down to every stakeholder level of General Motors.  The 
hourly workers were first to suffer from lack of a pay check.  Next to suffer were 
suppliers accumulating a glut of inventory with no cars to put them in.  The dealers than 
suffered profit loss from having empty dealerships, and stockholders cringed as profits 
plummeted throughout the strike.  The strike would forever color GM’s interaction with 
its labor force.  To this day, GM holds 113 days of inventory, well above the industry 
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average of 60 days of inventory.43
The workers considered themselves to be at the level of stockholders: deserving 
of the once vast profits of General Motors.  During the war effort the UAW did not strike 
to support the country, but following the war, the UAW would strike to support 
themselves.  According to Elphin, the UAW leaders felt that since GM had weathered the 
war profitably, that GM should open the books to them and give the workers a large raise.  
GM did not want to open the door to the possibility of collusion with the UAW to not 
maximize shareholder wealth, and refused to bargain with the union until after 113 days 
the conditions had deteriorated so much and so many plants were idling, that GM 
capitulated to workers demands in part by giving them an $0.18 per hour raise. 
  The union finally understood the power they held over 
the auto giant during the 113 day strike.  They took this to be indicative of their future 
power, and used their ability to destroy profits to their advantage. 
44
The collective bargaining agreement with the UAW in 1949 followed the 113-day 
strike.  Three provisions prevailed that would change how GM should have interacted 
with the union, and how union interaction would occur in the future with the Big Three.  
The first provision provided for an 11 cent per hour wage increase, of which 8 cents per 
hour was to return wages to 1940 levels of buying power, with the other three going to a 
  This 
capitulation to stakeholder pressure would only further strengthen the UAW, and reaffirm 
to them that bargaining through urgency would allow them to reap great rewards. 
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standard of living increase. 45  The second provision allowed for a one cent per hour 
increase for every 1.14 rise in the consumer price index, with a corresponding one cent 
per hour decrease (up to five cents) for a similar decline in the consumer price index. 46  
The first two provisions were innocuous enough; it was the third that would have the 
greatest effect on future labor relations.  The third provision stated “an additional three 
cents per hour will be added to all base rates on May 29, 1949.”47
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  This increase occurred 
regardless of a productivity increase, or even decrease.  The prevailing system prior to 
this provision was to reward productive workers with the corresponding increase in 
profits from increased auto sales.  This system rewarded worker productivity and made a 
raise the result of hard work.  GM perceived the union as having greater power than it 
actually did, and thus capitulated to their precedent setting demands to avoid a strike.  It 
was the union’s perceived power by GM, and not their actual power to collectively strike 
that drove the majority of stakeholder management with the firm in this period.  The 
collective bargaining agreement opened the door to further paternalism with GM, who 
would soon make the decision to care for its workers after their tenure with the firm, in 
the form of pension and healthcare benefits for retirees.  This paternalism continued 
GM’s desire to use the ineffective fairness model with their employees. 
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In the 1940’s, Alfred Sloan viewed pensions as “extravagant beyond reason.”48  
Pensions became a popular tool used by employers during WWII.  During the war, the 
government instituted wage freezes, so the only way firms could attract and retain more 
talented workers than their competitors was to use pension and health benefits as a way to 
increase compensation.  This strategy works well for small firms with high value added 
employees that would cost the firm if they were to defect.  In a large manufacturing 
company were the worker is as interchangeable as the work product, using pensions as a 
retention strategy appears to be flawed logic.  Moreover, Sloan understood even in the 
1940’s that the overwhelming legacy costs of pension and health costs could one day 
cripple the company.  Unfortunately, GM did not have a choice in giving out pensions.  
The UAW convinced Ford to give it pension benefits in 1949, GM had to follow suit by 
1950 in order to avoid alienating the Union and causing a strike.49
The UAW’s interconnectedness with not only the government but the other 
members of the Big Three was a tremendous failure in stakeholder power identification.  
This oversight made GM think it was in control over its stakeholder network through use 
  This is yet another 
example of a major policy decision dictated by the whims of Ford.  GM appears to be the 
market follower of Ford, innovating only after Ford places a burden on the company.  
GM’s stakeholder management strategy is seriously lacking in the cause and effect 
interaction between competitor decisions and decisions GM must face. 
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of paternalistic practices, when in fact GM was starting to become part of the UAW’s 
extended stakeholder network. 
It is this point that is not addressed in current stakeholder management literature.  
There are multiple, and oftentimes competing, goals between stakeholders.  It is 
necessary to expand network theory not only beyond dyadic ties in the case of Rowley, 
but beyond the perceived scope of the corporation.   
As the corporation grew in complexity, so too did its stakeholder network.  
Originally, it seemed reasonable to be firm focused, but the UAW changed the rules of 
the game with their collective bargaining practices.  The UAW would select a target for 
the year to use as a benchmark for future negotiations with the other major competitors in 
the auto industry.  Thus the UAW saw the Big 3 of the auto industry as its stakeholders to 
be played against each other.  It is this bargaining pattern that moved the UAW to the 
center of its own network, pushing GM to the outside.  This subtle shift occurred over 
time, but each concession made by any of the Big 3 automakers had a direct effect on the 
other members of the Big 3.  The charts below show the evolution of GM’s stakeholder 
network and how they should approach it over time. 
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Figure 1: General Motors Perceived Stakeholder Network 
 
Figure 2: General Motors Actual Stakeholder Network 
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Figure 3: General Motors Useful Stakeholder Network 
 
Had General Motors viewed itself within the third stakeholder model, then it 
would have been able to correct the mistakes of its past and reorient the company.  Its 
inability to be perceived as part of a greater network led to the problems that follow. 
1950 – 1990: Political “Stronger” 
By 1950 the framework for stakeholder interaction had been set.  GM was in the 
unenviable position of positioning itself at the center of its stakeholder network while not 
contemplating the implications of being a part of a larger stakeholder web.  Moreover, 
every decision GM made set a precedent for further decisions, such as leniency with the 
UAW or negative interactions with the government.  GM was foolhardy but trapped into 
offering the UAW pensions, but it was not alone in offering pensions to its workers in 
1950.  Pension became hugely popular in large corporation following WWII as a way to 
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attract soldiers who had already grown to expect a large corporation (specifically the 
military) taking care of them financially in exchange for years of their dedicated service.  
The graph below shows the increase in popularity of defined benefit pension funds. 
 
Table 2: Private Pension Level Comparisons
50
Soon the lure of a pension was not enough for the UAW; they felt entitled to more 
benefits.  This is reasonable from the framework of past interactions with GM; if the 
UAW could always use some method to get what they wanted, and the organizational 
structure and organizational culture of GM allowed this to continue, it only made sense 
for the union to continue to reap the benefits of bargaining.  The UAW through all of its 
actions did not appear to understand or care about the tremendous burden of their costs 
on the company, and decided to further burden the corporation by trying to limit the 
effects of business cycles on employees.  Since reward was already decoupled from 
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performance in the 1948 bargaining agreement, this was not a new strategy implemented 
by the UAW.  Elphin of the UAW argues for the Supplemental Unemployment Benefits: 
“Although the auto companies were relatively strong, they were also plagued by 
cyclical downturns in the industry.  Workers often found themselves out on the street 
during these downturns and during the then-annual changeover of models.  In 1955 the 
union took a major step in guaranteeing an annual wage with the adoption of the 
Supplemental Employment Benefit (SUB) program, an income cushion for laid-off 
workers.  This layoff protection plan has stood the test of time by providing hundreds of 
thousands of workers with an economic safety net during some lengthy interruptions of 
work.”51
Not only is this a poor stakeholder management decision of prioritizing the 
desires of labor in rough times during a poor business cycle, but it goes directly against 
the maximize shareholder wealth mantra by putting the extra capital of the company into 
the hands of workers over shareholders.  To use excess funding in unprofitable years to 
subsidize unneeded labor is poor management.  Unfortunately, there didn’t appear to be a 
better way for General Motors at the time.  GM had cultivated a paternalistic culture of 
giving into the demands of the UAW, and if the wants and desires weren’t met, there was 
an ever-present possibility of strike.  This consistent acceptance of the bargaining terms 
of the UAW throughout time severely limited GM’s ability to change bargaining 
strategies and by extension stakeholder management strategies over time with the UAW.  
Past weaknesses in bargaining would be yet another legacy cost GM was forced to carry. 
 
Worker wages, even unemployment wages, were far from the biggest labor costs 
plaguing the organization.  The number of workers covered by GM through defined-
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benefit pensions was growing exponentially as the decades went on, but corporate profits 
were not keeping pace with the growing burden of a workforce aging out of work and 
into their pensions.  In 1962 GM was in a relatively strong position, with 464,000 
employees supporting 31,351 hourly pension plan recipients and 8,885 salaried pension 
plan recipients.52
 
  GM knew this balance would not last long.  To get the increasingly 
higher returns on their pension assets required to keep their plans funded for the increase 
of pension plan recipients in the future there was a dramatic shift in pension plan asset 
allocation from fixed income securities to equities, as shown in the graphs below. 
Figure 4: Fixed income and equity percentage funding levels of public fund assets 
Source: www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/03 
 
This industry-wide shift from fixed income to equities would prove incredibly 
risky.  While returns were high in good years, choosing an asset allocation heavy on 
equities for pension beneficiaries who see the money as their only source of income 
would magnify problems in years where the market is down.  Placing fund assets in 
equities magnifies problems for firms that are sensitive to shifts in the economy.  A firm 
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like GM, who invests their pension assets heavily in equities, experiences major problems 
when the economy is down, because fewer people will buy cars because of budget 
constraints, thus at the moments when their pension is most underfunded because of 
reductions in equity returns, the company is least able to contribute to the fund to bring it 
up to a fully funded level.  Moreover, in times of economic hardship, retired pension 
beneficiaries are least able to find work to supplement their dwindling pension benefits.  
Add to this the SUB paying workers even when GM has reduced revenues in poor 
business cycles, and GM is facing the perfect storm, and it is how GM has managed their 
pension assets for decades.  The UAW likely foresaw this dilemma, and used their 
considerable government influence to get more of a guarantee for their pension assets.  In 
this period GM still viewed its stakeholders through the network model, seeing itself as 
the center of stakeholders, pushing the UAW and the government away from the center.  
The Mitchell, Agle, Wood model would have been more appropriate in this instance.  
Their model would have emphasized that GM understand the power, legitimacy, and 
urgency of each stakeholder group.  GM understood that the UAW and the government 
had power and legitimacy, but GM did not understand the urgency.  The union foresaw 
an underfunded pension plan as urgent, because pensions were implemented in 1950.  By 
1970 the original pension beneficiaries were 10 years away from “30 and out” with a full 
pension.  The UAW wanted that pension money to be around 10 years in the future.  The 
government also had urgency.  GM was one of the largest employers in the US, and the 
largest industrial manufacturer.  The government was concerned that if the pension was 
underfunded, that the government would have to pay for the retirements of a largely 
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unemployable group of auto workers nearing retirement age.  Both the UAW and the 
Government had strong incentive to force GM to guarantee their pension fund. 
The combined urgency of the UAW and the government pension needs, 
historically amicable stakeholders, led congress to pass ERISA in 1974.53
GM’s lack of full resistance to ERISA would be the beginning of a period of 
imbalanced stakeholder interactions with the government.  GM, through all of its actions 
over the period, to soon be discussed in further detail, appeared to support the 
government actions that would cause the greatest increases in costs, and rebel against the 
government actions that would in cases have returned it to future profitability. 
  Unfortunately, 
this guarantee is not backed by the corporations, but by the American taxpayers.  The 
corporations pay what amounts to a negligible fee per worker per year to the Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Corporation, which in turn is responsible for ensuring all participating 
pension plans.  Unfortunately, the PBGC does not have control over how long a pension 
can remain underfunded before it forces the company to fund the plan.  Additionally, 
companies can use many accounting tricks to avoid fully funding their pension, tactics 
which will not be discussed in further detail in this paper. 
The Government did not act solely in the interest of the UAW during the post-war 
period.  They also wanted to ensure that the consumer was protected from dangerous 
automobiles.  Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 
1966 to establish a government body to oversee automobile safety.  This led to the 
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creation of the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration.  The auto industry 
as a whole was not thrilled with the legislation.  GM was concerned that the extra cost of 
safety would decrease its profitability; fortunately the rest of the auto industry was trying 
to evade the requirements of the NHTSA as soon as they were announced.  GM rallied 
strongly against the NHTSA, but given the state of automobile safety at the time, GM 
could have designed its cars to be safer and position itself in the customer’s mind as a car 
that is wallet and person friendly.  Safety as strategic positioning was, and is, lost on GM.  
Buick has been consistently rated one of the safest automobiles on the road, yet GM has 
failed to position the positive traits of safety into the consumers mind, instead leaving 
Buick to languish from continued years of decreased popularity.   
GM wasn’t the only player in the auto industry to fight against the NHTSA, the first 
major defeat of NHTSA legislation would come from Chrysler.  Chrysler did not want to 
pay to install passive restraints in all of their cars. Standard 208 required that automobiles 
be equipped with passive restraints that would protect dummies from a front-end collision 
at 30 miles per hour.  Chrysler jumped at the opportunity to use NHTSA legislation to 
defeat Standard 208.  They found “under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, an objective 
measure for determining compliance to the standard is required.  The court found that the 
test dummy of Standard 208 did not provide such objectivity.”54
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  The auto industry was 
already setting up defenses to push the government as a stakeholder as far outside of the 
network as possible.  GM would follow suit and engage in many instances of legal action 
against the NHTSA from its founding until the modern era.  Most notably, GM objected 
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to recalls of its vehicles.  As recently as 2005, GM received the largest fine ever levied by 
the NHTSA, $1,000,000 for failure to timely report a recall.55
All of GM’s policies and stakeholder interactions would lead to large and 
increasing costs per vehicle over the years.  It is ineffective stakeholder management that 
led to huge increasing cost per car over the years, which led to subsequent drops in 
marketshare. 
 
 
Figure 5: GM Market Share vs. Imports from 1920-2009 
Source: http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/quinn/2009/0226.html 
 
The 1980’s ushered in the wave of foreign competitors at a large scale.  General 
Motors was competing in a new post-oil crisis landscape where Americans were 
considering the price of fuel, and the idea of making a larger initial investment in a 
foreign car to reap the rewards of lower maintenance and fuel costs.  The foreign 
                                                          
55 http://money.cnn.com/2005/01/13/pf/autos/gm_nhtsa_fine/index.htm  
Accessed 4/12/2010 
58 
 
automakers also ushered in a new wave of concerns, previously unaddressed in the auto 
industry: nonunion shops in the US. 
“We as a corporation cannot afford to have nonunion automobile plants in this country 
any more than the union can . . . We cannot compete with a nonunion company building 
automobiles at the prices I think they could do it at in this country.” 
-Alfred Warren, GM’s Labor Relations VP, 198556
 
 
 
The other large unaddressed issue of foreign movement into the US auto industry 
is that a new entrant into the US auto sector would not have the same crushing pension 
burden of the Big Three.  In the 1980’s GM’s paternalistic pension burden was already 
beginning to strain the corporation.  Pension fund assets were less than pension fund 
liabilities, and the opportunity cost of investing in pension assets was losing the 
technological fight with the Japanese to produce a superior automobile.  By 1982 GM 
was already losing the battle to fund its pension as seen in the augmented balance sheet 
below. 
 
Table 3: GM 1982 Pension Liabilities
57
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Simply put, there were always better uses for the company’s assets than pension 
funding.  Not only did pension funding not maximize stockholder wealth, it was a severe 
burden on the continuing health of the company.  The burden of its pension and health 
debts, along with falling market share started to crush it.  The graph below of their 
operating margin (net income/net revenues) shows that this trend has been fairly steady 
for the past 50 years. 
 
Figure 6: General Motors Operating Margin, 1959-2008 
Source: http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/03/gms-problems-are-50-years-in-making.html 
 
The corporation has made it nearly impossible to disburden themselves of their 
legacy costs and employment glut.  The labor agreements of 1984-87 made things only 
more difficult.  These labor agreements ushered the creation of the jobs banks.  The jobs 
bank system forced GM to continue to pay and give benefits to workers that had no 
current job to do.  GM actually suggested the idea.  The jobs bank was seen as an ideal 
place to keep older workers who would otherwise be permanently unemployed, as their 
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manufacturing acumen was not readily transferable.  This was only the logical expansion 
of the SUB from the 1950’s which paid unemployed workers during down business 
cycles.  During GM’s revitalization and growth in the mid-‘80’s, the corporation thought 
it made sense to not fire workers and train new ones in times when the organization 
needed a high mobility of trained labor at different times for different projects. 
“The idea was to help train or find jobs for senior UAW employees who would 
"otherwise be permanently laid off" because of better technology or higher productivity. 
Once the idea was on the table, GM agreed to expand it as the UAW ratcheted up 
pressure for a deal. A strike at a few locals was gradually spreading to engulf more than 
half the company. GM's first proposals, noted in documents from early September 1984, 
described a three-year program for employees with 10 years of experience costing no 
more than $500 million in total. The union sent back a demand that the program cover 
workers with six years on the job, run for six years and cost as much as $1 billion. GM 
agreed, and later said even one-year workers could join.” 58
The agreement, just as the 1948 bargaining agreement with the UAW made sense 
for the business conditions of the time.  Unfortunately, GM in its avoidance of a strike 
which would temporarily lower stockholder wealth, made a terrible agreement in 1984.  
GM perceived the power of the UAW and their strike potential to be greater than the 
actual power of an organization comprised of auto workers who would have difficulty 
finding employment elsewhere.  The jobs bank made the UAW feel more secure, and did 
not show up on GM’s balance sheets separate from worker wages.  However, the job 
banks soon made it essentially impossible for GM to fire a UAW worker.  “The jobs bank 
provides that if workers were laid off due to reasons that were in control of the company 
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(layoffs due to technological change, corporate reorganization, outsourcing, or negotiated 
productivity improvements) the workers receive full compensation while put in job 
banks.”59
The UAW showed by the mid-1980’s it had the ability to influence not only the 
other members of the Big 3, but smaller actors outside of the firm, like GM’s suppliers.  
Delphi became frustrated over ballooning costs associated with the UAW, and found 
their wage structure too restrictive.  Delphi was forced to pay UAW workers “$27 per 
hour in wages and benefits, the same as GM workers and higher than the roughly $15 per 
  GM was forced under contract with the UAW to keep people employed even if 
major efficiency gains allowed them to operate more efficiently.  The only way workers 
could be fired and not maintained on payroll was if demand decreased.  Unfortunately, as 
evidenced by the annual reports, GM consistently tried to increase demand for their 
automobiles to get the revenues to help pay for their legacy costs.  While the power of the 
UAW was dynamic, increasing and decreasing over time, GM’s perception of the UAW’s 
power was that it only increased over time.  It is the problem with how to define and 
quantify power that draws the greatest critique of Mitchell, Agle, Wood and their power 
legitimacy, urgency structure.  A dynamic stakeholder model must be employed in a real 
corporation that must adjust to dynamic market conditions all the time.  GM’s treatment 
of the UAW as a highly powerful stakeholder only increased the UAW’s power outside 
of the organization. 
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hour paid by most suppliers.” 60  The UAW also forced Delphi to maintain a “jobs bank 
that keeps 4,000 workers on the payroll even when the company has no work for 
them.” 61
In the late 1980’s the corporation tried ways to become more profitable by 
increasing revenues, knowing that it needed to try to outpace its increasing costs.  
“Recognizing that management, unions, and employer must cooperate in unprecedented 
ways to meet today 's and tomorrow's competitive challenge, the new pacts are also 
significant in that they improve job security. Management believes that job security 
programs are very important because they encourage employer to play a major role in 
improving operational effectiveness.”
   
62  Roger Smith’s response to the jobs bank makes 
the picture seem far rosier than it is.  GM’s unwillingness or inability to negotiate 
contracts that bring mutual benefit (collaboration) show the fallacy of the fairness model 
and demonstrate that GM may be shifting outside the center of the focus of its 
stakeholder network, even losing touch with the union.  Smith discusses “New three-year 
labor agreements were negotiated with the United Auto Workers and other unions – 
forward - looking and far – reaching agreements reached in a new spirit of teamwork that 
facilitates the vital partnership between management and labor.”63
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teamwork and partnership with the UAW is undermined by his use of the passive voice 
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GM understands that the UAW may be a stakeholder group that GM can no longer 
control. 
GM is trying to maximize the wealth of multiple stakeholders at the same time in 
1987.  They emphasize their strong allegiance to stakeholders in this annual report, 
stressing “in 1987 we paid common dividends for the 73rd consecutive year, the longest 
uninterrupted dividend payment record of any US auto manufacturer.  Moreover, during 
the past four years, our cumulative dividends paid have been more than double the 
combined dividends paid by our two largest domestic competitors.  This is, of course, 
consistent with our historic dedication to serve the best interests of our stockholders.”64
 
  
The antiquated approach of maximizing shareholder wealth does not seem strange for a 
paternalistic company with an organizational structure that hasn’t changed in over a half-
century.  GM’s unwillingness to change its internal structure explains, but does not 
excuse it from using a dynamic approach to stakeholder management.  A more dynamic 
approach to all aspects of the company would have allowed it to survive as a more 
effective company. 
Annual Reports throughout the years: 
1987: “We can be expected to grow even stronger and more profitable in the years 
ahead.” 
Source: 1987 Annual Report 
 
1988: “GM is a far stronger corporation today because of the massive rebuilding 
that has  taken place during the 1980s.” 
Source: 1988 Annual Report 
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1989: “We are exceptionally strong in the fastest growing segments” 
 Source: 1989 Annual Report 
1990: “Part of our plan to position the company for stronger performance in the 
future.” 
 Source: 1990 Annual Report 
1991: “This new General Motors will contribute to a stronger national and world 
economy” 
Source: 1991 Annual Report 
 
1992: Net Income (loss) = ($23,465,800,000) 
Source: 1992 Annual Report 
 
 
Post 1992: Competitive “Winning” 
Stockholders and the world alike felt blindsided upon learning of the magnitude 
of the loss in net income in 1992.  This was the first year where the government required 
GM in its accounting practices to include the burden of legacy costs such as healthcare 
and pension in their financial statements.  The number is staggering.  What is more 
surprising is that GM’s attempt to maximize shareholder wealth made them create 
deceptive (but not illegal) financial statements, and bargain with the UAW to keep 
balance sheet costs low.  Needless to say, after 1992, GM does not emphasize their 
“strength” as a corporation.  Instead their 1992 Annual Report message to shareholders is 
entitled “How We Will Win.”   
This antidote about organizational culture, the “strength” and “win” aspects of the 
corporation, destined it to lose. Scholars have argued that organizational culture can be 
seen as a path dependent variable.  Argyres and Liebeskind discuss the problems 
associated with governance inseparability.  They imply that if a firm has a long-standing 
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organizational culture that it can limit their future ability to do business.  First, a set 
organizational culture “may constrain a firm from switching from one governance mode 
to another for the same type of transaction. Second, governance inseparability may 
obligate a firm to use an existing governance arrangement for a new transaction, even if 
that particular transaction would be governed more efficiently by other means.”65  This 
aligns well with expectancy-value theory, wherein workers have a set of values or beliefs 
that make them expect certain behaviors from managers.66
The graph below of revenues compared to net income over the period show that 
the strength of the UAW in contract negotiations for wage and benefit increases must 
have won over the desire for profitability of the corporation.  Net income is virtually 
stagnant over the 20 – year period despite consistent revenue growth. 
  Since General Motors 
exercised such great paternalism early on, and had consistently buckled to the demands of 
the UAW, the UAW could only assume that this type of interaction would continue to be 
the norm.  This inability to manage in a more efficient way because of the hindrance of 
past actions would be yet another legacy burden for General Motors. 
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Figure 7: GM Revenue and Net Income from 1985-2004 
Source: Analysis of Annual Reports and 10-K for GM from 1985-2004 
 
The above graph should concern both executives and investors in General Motors.  
Only in 1992, where the record loss was noted as a change in accounting practices, does 
the net income truly reflect the poor financial position of the company.  In fact, GM 
refused to use the accounting practices of 1992 in any subsequent year, stating: “The 
Corporation does not admit or otherwise acknowledge that such amounts [non-pension 
retirement benefits] or existing postretirement benefit plans of the Corporation (other 
than pensions) represent legally enforceable liabilities of the Corporation.”67
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under their bargaining agreements with the UAW is legally responsible for the healthcare 
of their workers under the current terms of the bargaining agreement.  Until the terms of 
the bargaining agreement change in a more favorable manner towards General Motors, 
the corporation needs to accept responsibility and warn potential investors about their 
enormous legacy costs.  The statement is a thinly veiled commentary in the government 
requirement that GM must legally uphold its pension obligation to the UAW.  Any 
pension promised in the past cannot be changed even if the UAW would ever concede to 
the change. 
The rapid increase of jobs bank participants will only increase given the current 
economic climate.  GM cannot afford the amount of employees they have, and can only 
choose to buy them out or hope they retire to get them to leave.  Regardless of their 
choice, stockholder wealth has forever been affected, and equity financing will be very 
hard to come by in the future.  GM’s stockholder wealth optimization model worked until 
their legacy costs began to affect their balance sheet.  The chart below shows GM’s share 
price and their share price compared with the Dow Jones Industrial Index, from which it 
has recently been de-listed. 
 
General Motors Historical Share Price from 1962-2010 
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Figure 8: General Motors Historical Share Price from 1962-2010 
Source:http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=gm#chart1:symbol=gm;range=my;indicator=volume;charttype=line;crosshair=on;ohlcvalu
es=0;logscale=off;source=undefined 
 
Comparison of General Motors Share Price and the Dow Jones Industrial Index from 
1962-2010 
 
Figure 9: General Motors Historical Share Price from 1962-2010 compared to DJIA 
Source:http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=gm#chart4:symbol=gm;range=my;compare=^dji;indicator=volume;charttype=line;crossha
ir=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=off;source=undefined 
 
What is interesting to note about the above two graphs is that despite tremendous 
losses in 1992, a consistently decreasing operating margin, GM still managed to 
maximize shareholder wealth until roughly 2001 when the stock market bubble first.  
This is the flaw with the maximize shareholder wealth mantra.  GM was effective in 
maximizing shareholder wealth for decades, with consistently high dividends, yet it 
engaged in increasingly poor stakeholder management policies which ultimately led it to 
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fail.  Maximizing shareholder wealth can still fail the company when it does not 
effectively manage stakeholders, while effective stakeholder management results in 
maximizing shareholder wealth. 
After the stock market bubble burst in 2001, GM needed some way to recover the 
losses to their pension portfolio.  The jobs bank was rapidly increasing costs, giving GM 
a disincentive to increase productivity when car sales were essentially stagnant.  This is 
why GM’s drastic increase in productivity was a poor strategy to deal with the increasing 
costs they faced. 
 
Figure 10: GM North American Plant total hours per vehicle 
Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119079465500439816.html 
 
GM would only have a larger idle workforce if it decreased the time to make each 
car.  When GM reduced the time to assemble a car by 15 hours per car, it was still forced 
to pay the workers for 15 hours of doing nothing.  The only decision GM seemed to have 
to control its ballooning labor costs was to reduce the size of its salaried workforce.  The 
figure below shows GM was having modest success in this arena.  Despite their success 
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in reducing the salaried workforce, the salaried workforce represented less than 1/3 of 
their total labor pool and far less of their costs. 
 
Figure 11: Actual and projected reduction in GM salaried workforce 
Source: GM 1992 Annual Report 
 
GM has far more control over their salaried workforce than their unionized 
workforce.  So much control in fact, that hourly workers try not to hone their skills to get 
to the point where they could be tapped for promotion into the salaried track.  The hourly 
track is more lucrative, and the opportunity to sit for years in a jobs bank and perform 
community service while still getting paid is extremely alluring.  The graph below shows 
the increase in job bank employees, a number only certain to rise in the future. 
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Figure12: Number of jobs bank workers comparison from 2005-2006 
Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114118143005186163.html?mg=com-wsj
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GM was cost competitive in both car and labor prices within the Big Three, but 
foreign competition brought new stakeholders into the mix.  The market share differential 
was only exacerbated by the profit differential due to labor costs in making the cars.  Not 
only was GM selling fewer cars, but their profit per car was decreasing as their mounting 
legacy costs were increasing.  The auto giant was beginning to be crushed by its own 
weight.  The labor cost disparity grew to overwhelming proportions by 2006, due for the 
most part to the fact that the Japanese typically run non-union factories in the South, a 
region known for being typically unwilling to unionize.  The chart below shows the 
magnitude of the wage disparity. 
                                                          
68 McCraken, Jeffrey. “Detroit's Symbol of Dysfunction: Paying Employees Not to Work”  
Wall Street Journal March 1, 2006.   
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114118143005186163.html?mg=com-wsj 
Accessed 4/9/2010 
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Figure 13: Average hourly labor costs comparison 
Source: http://seekingalpha.com/article/122787-as-gm-goes-so-goes-the-nation-part-2 
 
 
Figure 14: Average hourly labor cost comparison breakdown 
Source: http://bigthreeauto.procon.org/view.additional-resource.php?resourceID=2050 
 
The labor disparity had been growing for decades.  So too, did the perceived 
power of the UAW in the minds of GM.  This led to consistently poor stakeholder 
management as the demands became overwhelming.  The graph below shows the growth 
in employee labor costs over time. 
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Figure 15: Average hourly labor cost by year for GM from 1984-2004 
Source: Data collected from 1985-2004 Annual Report 
 
The costs of employees was underscored by their tremendous legacy burden, and 
firing workers only led to greater problems within the organization, as discussed in the 
chart and statement to shareholders below. 
 
Figure 16: Legacy cost burden in1962 and 2005 
Source: GM 2005 Annual Report 
  
“Stated another way, for every active GM employee in the United States last year, 
GM supported 3.2 retirees and surviving spouses.  Back in 1962, the employee/retiree 
ratio was reverse: GM had 11.5 active employees for every retiree or surviving spouse in 
our pension plans.”69
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management had finally caught up to the corporation.  The company was no longer able 
to give the same dividends it had in the past, angering the shareholders in the process.  
The failure to manage one stakeholder, the UAW, was severely affecting GM’s ability to 
manage the stockholders needs. 
 
The legacy cost burden made it increasingly difficult for GM to fund their pension.  
The pension funding burden made GM willing to put less money in their pension fund at 
a higher risk, hoping that the greater risk potential of equities was worth the trade off, and 
for a time, the risk was worth the reward, as evidenced by their consistently high returns 
in the graph below. 
 
Figure 17: GM annual return on pension fund assets 1987-2003 
Source: General Motors US Pension Review Dec 12, 2003 
 
GM had two problems with this strategy.  First, if the company consistently 
funded its pension, the assets would have more time to grow and the interest would 
compound.  Second, as described earlier, GM exposes itself to unnecessary risk by 
heavily investing in stocks given that the company’s performance is tied to the 
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performance of the economy as a whole.  GM is least able to fund its pension to 
appropriate levels when the economy is down, which also corresponds with when the 
pension assets are worth the least.  The chart below shows the degree to which the 
pension was funded over a ten year period.  The 2001-2002 time period demonstrates the 
problems with heavy equity investment, as that time period was when the market 
experienced a huge crash. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: GM annual pension funding levels from 1993-2002 
Source: General Motors US Pension Review Dec. 12, 2003 
 
The underfunding of the pension stood in violation of ERISA and made the 
government concerned, as the government was concerned about having to use taxpayers 
to support the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation if GM were to default or go 
bankrupt. 
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These problems would have been minimized if GM were increasing its revenues 
as much as their increase in auto offerings would have suggested.  Unfortunately, they 
over emphasized their promise of “a car for every purse and purpose.”  They had multiple 
offerings for the same price (purse) and multiple cars that served the same purpose.  
Sloan had explicitly said that there were to be no overlaps in vehicle offerings at any 
price, but the decentralization at the company made it very difficult to monitor what 
designers for each product line were working on.  Moreover, the acquisition of different 
brand lines over the years increased problems because those brands had a target and price 
point before they were acquired.  This redundant strategy magnified as brand lines started 
to cannibalize business from each other.  The organizational structure and culture of lack 
of communication led to redundancies that went unaddressed for too long, as evidenced 
in the graphs below. 
 
Figure 19: Every car offered by GM in 2008 
Source: From data compiled for all 2008 GM car offerings from Vehix.com 
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Figure 20: Car offerings in 2008 excluding product lines expected to be discontinued post bankruptcy 
Source: From Data compiled for all 2008 GM car offerings from Vehix.com (not including brands GM intended to 
discontinue or spin off post-bankruptcy 
The graph of auto offerings from “Old GM” (pre-bankruptcy GM) demonstrate 
that GM had multiple auto offerings at the same price points, most noticeably with Saab 
completely overlapping Cadillac at all price points despite similar offerings.  It comes as 
no surprise that the Saab sold so poorly given that its biggest competitor was Cadillacs at 
the same price.  GM in its desire to continue to meet every customer’s need allowed the 
company to overlook their redundant models and product offerings until far too late.  
GM’s antiquated car for “every purse and purpose” strategy is in stark contrast to foreign 
brands like Toyota and Honda who offer only three versions of each model, the baseline, 
mid-range, and luxury editions.  GM offers thousands of variations for each of their cars 
in terms of customization options.  GM’s auto offerings are not only poor management of 
customer as stakeholder, but also a poor use of their already over-priced labor’s time to 
increase customization. 
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GM ultimately failed because it did not understand where it stood within its 
stakeholder network, nor did it understand at any given point which stakeholders had 
legitimacy, urgency, or power.  GM’s past history gave a perception to all of its 
stakeholders that it would continue to interact with them the same way they had in the 
past.  The limitations of organizational culture as a determinant for stakeholder 
interaction driving the firm’s inability to collaborate or change any of its stakeholder 
interactions over time proved less than fair for all stakeholders involved with the 
corporation.  Implementation of collaboration early on and an analysis of stakeholder 
interactions outside of the perceived direct network of stakeholders would have changed 
the course of business. 
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
Current stakeholder theory can be a guide to the firm, but it lacks the proper 
framework.  A firm can apply many theories to its stakeholder network and enjoy success.  
The flaws in stakeholder management theory arise when they are applied to a firm 
consistently with an individual stakeholder group over time.  The firm will optimize its 
stakeholder management strategy by interacting with a stakeholder and analyzing the 
effects of that interaction on another stakeholder.  For example, in General Motor’s 
interactions with the government, it should see this interaction as not linear between the 
government and GM, but as a network that affects GM, the government, and the UAW.  
This is where Freeman’s collaboration piece can be elaborated.  Freeman framed 
collaboration as something a firm should do, while in application, a firm is forced to 
collaborate with many outside stakeholder groups in its interaction with a single 
stakeholder. 
This larger network approach to stakeholder theory would have remedied the 
problems GM was facing.  Checks and balances exist for each of the stakeholder groups 
in General Motors greater stakeholder network.  Whether or not those checks and 
balances are within the organizations is less important than knowing that each 
stakeholder action can have a possible consequence.  Most outside observers would think 
that the UAW exists almost unchecked, having survived even the company’s bankruptcy 
in the worst recession since the great depression.  This is not the case.  It is foreign 
competitors and globalization that keep the UAW in line.  “Unions realize that they have 
become global; shutting down all or most of U.S. manufacturing would not shut out US 
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customers.  Overseas suppliers are there to supply the market.”70
The United States Steel Corporation was too big to be beaten by 300,000 working men.  It had too large a 
cash surplus, too many allies among other businesses, too much support from government officers, local 
and national, too strong influence with social institutions such as the press and pulpit, it spread over too 
much earth – still retaining absolutely centralized control – to be defeated by widely scattered workers of 
many minds, many fears, varying states of pocketbook and under a comparatively improvised leadership. 
  Increased competition 
within the global market is a natural check to curb anti-competitive behavior with the 
UAW.  GM needs to use globalization to its advantage to let the auto giant come out 
ahead as opposed to be mired behind the foreign automakers.  Competition is the 
leverage that GM has over the union.  Moreover, if GM stressed and understood that the 
UAW did not have the level of perceived power GM had originally thought then GM 
would have been in a stronger position to bargain and collaborate with the UAW. 
Interchurch World Commission report on the 1919 steel strike71
 
 
 
 
Instead of using its bargaining leverage over the UAW, it instead treated its 
workers in much the same way as US Steel, and is suffering the same consequences.  GM 
saw itself as the center of a weak stakeholder network, not fully understanding the 
connections forming around among its stakeholder groups.  General Motors storied 
history of conflicts with its workers, the government, suppliers, and consumers 
demonstrate the flaws with its stakeholder management policies. 
Every stakeholder in GM’s network has power, but GM consistently attempted to 
be at the center of its stakeholder network.  GM’s adherence to Rowley’s network theory 
led to organizational problems.  Rowley contends that an organization wants its 
                                                          
70 Levitt, Theodore.  The Globalization of Markets.  Harvard Business Review May-June 1983.  Reprint 
83308 pg 8 
71 J. Raymond Walsh, CIO: Industrial Unionism in Action (New York, 1937), 56 (from Labor’s War at Home) 
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stakeholders to have a low density to centralize, thus necessitating the stakeholder group 
has a low level of communication efficiency.72
GM relentlessly focused on their internal stakeholders, basically ignoring their 
external stakeholders of the government and stockholders at a certain point.  Even 
ignoring customer tastes in the final period of the corporation prior to bankruptcy with 
their excessive car offerings.  This relationship of focusing on internal versus external 
stakeholders is unique, as most stakeholder theories would expect a greater focus on 
external stakeholders. 
  This theory, while ideal, does not work 
with GM’s existing network.  The UAW is a highly unified stakeholder with high 
communication efficiency, low barriers to entry for membership, and little incentive to 
not use its influence over the organization.  The UAW’s power, aside from the influence 
of GM’s other stakeholders, does not allow GM to be at the center of its stakeholder 
network.  This requires a different organizational structure, and necessitates a high level 
of communication between organization and stakeholders. 
GM has instead prioritized the needs of the UAW over its other stakeholders 
because of the perceived power of the UAW.  GM currently pays $73.2673
                                                          
72 Rowley, T.J., Moving Beyond Dyadic Ties: A Network Theory of Stakeholder Influences,  Academy of 
Management Review, 22(4), 1997, 887-910 
 per hour in 
legacy costs and hourly wages for every hourly worker it employs.  This figure does not 
include the overwhelming legacy costs of its retired workforce, as accounting loopholes 
73 http://www.mrswing.com/articles/GM_Paid_Per_Hour_for_Labor_Costs_in.html 
Accessed 2/18/2010 
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allow GM to take those costs off of the books.  This tremendous overhead cost is what 
allows GM to make such large revenues while remaining unprofitable.   
GM also did not understand the degree of collaboration among stakeholders in 
what it saw as its stakeholder network.  History could not separate the UAW from the 
government; it is therefore illogical that GM would treat them as fundamentally separate 
agencies.  Its approach with each over history has demonstrated that it does not fully 
understand the degree of collaboration between its stakeholders. 
GM consistently underestimated the power of its stakeholders, and their ability to 
analyze stakeholders outside of the firm.  If GM had analyzed the motives of its 
stakeholders before attempting to either collaborate or compete with them, it would 
currently be in a far stronger financial position.  Its inability to change to meet the needs 
of changing market conditions and consumer demands in the last 20 years of its existence 
is echoed in its ability to dynamically adjust to the needs of its stakeholders over the 
corresponding period. 
 A corporation needs to understand the strengths and limitations of being part of a 
larger stakeholder network, and how collaboration early on can mitigate the effects of 
decision made by other entities affecting their stakeholders.   
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
General Motors is merely the most recent example of a huge corporation failing due to 
poor stakeholder management.  As evidenced in GM’s relationships with stakeholders, it 
took a very long time before the results of poor stakeholder management caught up to the 
corporation.  This case study should serve as an example to other corporations that may 
not notice the dangers that they face or the slippery slope they have embarked upon.  
Collaboration is a relatively recent addition to the field of stakeholder theory, but it is not 
too late for any organization to attempt to integrate stakeholder collaboration into their 
greater stakeholder management. 
 The key to adding collaboration is to have a dynamic relationship and 
understanding of the stakeholders in the corporation.  Analyzing business conditions both 
inside and outside of the firm can allow the corporation to understand the actual power of 
a stakeholder, as a failure in stakeholder management policies can lead the corporation to 
perceive the stakeholder has more power than in reality. 
Given more time, it would be interesting to look at the larger network of the Big Three as 
a network and determine how each interacted with each other in the market.  Their 
differing approach to stakeholders both internal and external to the firm along with their 
interactions with the other firms in the network could add greater insight to stakeholder 
theory.  The history and interconnectedness at the industry level as opposed to the firm 
level could prove useful to the field. 
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This research concluded prior to the announced bankruptcy of General Motors.  An 
interesting stakeholder analysis of prioritization in times of crisis could be determined by 
examining General Motors and its greater stakeholder network over the bankruptcy 
period and beyond to see how severe financial crisis can alter long-standing stakeholder 
relationships and possibly serve to keep the corporation in business.  Collaboration and 
prioritization as a last result could yield interesting results to the strength and 
expectations of stakeholder relationships over time. 
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